To deter is central for strategic thinking. Some of the more astute observations regarding the dynamics of deterrence were made during the Cold War by game theorists. This set the stage for how deterrence has come to be studied. A strong methodological element like the research on deterrence’s reliance on game theory requires examination in order to understand what sort of knowledge it actually yields. What sort of knowledge does one acquire when deterrence is viewed through game theoretic models? How do they inform us about the phenomenon of deterrence? To understand the nature of a phenomenon through models requires idealization, which in turn presupposes assumptions. This licentiate thesis investigates the type of knowledge we attain when approaching deterrence from a game theoretic perspective. The two articles presented address two separate but related issues. The first article reviews a debate regarding which deterrence model best capture the phenomena of deterrence, i.e. how models can be compared to one and other. The article presents a framework for comparing models and then appraises how these different deterrence models inform us about deterrence. The second article uses one of the more central deterrence models in order to evaluate how and to what extent the naval operation Atalanta managed to deter the Somali piracy. / <p>QC 20190201</p>
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:kth-240090 |
Date | January 2019 |
Creators | Sörenson, Karl |
Publisher | KTH, Filosofi och historia, Stockholm |
Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
Language | English |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Licentiate thesis, comprehensive summary, info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis, text |
Format | application/pdf |
Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
Relation | TRITA-ABE-DLT ; 1845 |
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