We discuss main facts of symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE) of position auction proposed by Varian (2007). Then we describe more features in detail, such as (1) non-zero surplus of each bidder, (2) allocative and also Pareto efficiency in SNE and (3)the condition of existence of honest strategy in SNE. After that, we propose a best-response bidding strategy for repeated simultaneous position auction of incomplete information with simulation. This approach offers an explanation that how bidders may follow public information to achieve the same equilibrium of lower bound of SNE in the static model. Furthermore, the best-response bidding strategy has following merits: (1) non-zero surplus of each bidder in each round, (2) low information requirement for each bidder¡¦s calculation, (3) much lower increasing rate of rounds than increasing rate of positions and (4) easier rule for bidders to get started with.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0701111-193753 |
| Date | 01 July 2011 |
| Creators | Chen, Tzu-yin |
| Contributors | Shih-shen Chen, Tru-gin Liu, Yung-nian Tung |
| Publisher | NSYSU |
| Source Sets | NSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
| Language | Cholon |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0701111-193753 |
| Rights | unrestricted, Copyright information available at source archive |
Page generated in 0.002 seconds