Return to search

The polictical economy informed lobbies

Made available in DSpace on 2008-05-13T13:16:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
2104.pdf: 315512 bytes, checksum: 16b71315d3c0036ed419b563fa5346a8 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2005-12-15 / We analize a discrete type version of a common agency model with informed principals of Martimort and Moreira (2005) in the context of lobby games. We begin discussing issues related to the common values nature of the model, i.e.the agent cares directly about the principal’s utility function. With this feature the equilibrium of Martimort and Moreira (2005) is not valid. We argue in favor of one solution, although we are not able to fully characterize the equilibrium in this context. We then turn to an application: a modification of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of lobbying for tariff protection to incoporate assimetric information (but disconsidering the problem of common values) in the lobbies objective function. We show that the main results of the original model do not hold and that lobbies may behave less agressively towards the police maker when there is private information in the lobbies valuation for the tariffs.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:IBICT/oai:bibliotecadigital.fgv.br:10438/103
Date15 December 2005
CreatorsLima, Rafael Coutinho Costa
ContributorsEscolas::EPGE, FGV, Moreira, Humberto Ataíde
Source SetsIBICT Brazilian ETDs
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
Sourcereponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas, instacron:FGV
Rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

Page generated in 0.0018 seconds