This thesis analyses the role of commitment in bargaining. Chapter 1 looks at how players could use finite length commitment to affect the bargaining model in a multiperiod model. The idea of this is to complement the existing literature on infinite length commitment. In line with the infinite commitment literature, a rational player can mimic a commitment type to gain a considerable advantage, although, as will be seen, there are key differences. Chapter 2 analyses whether one should take the opportunity to commit oneself when the opponent does not perfectly observe the decision taken. Logically, if one’s opponent sees no difference between a bluff and actual commitment then one may as well bluff, since the opponent acts the same and committing is a needless sacrifice of freedom. When the opponent may discover a bluff as such, the situation is far less clear and this Chapter analyses when a commitment outcome is likely to prevail. Chapter 3 takes a rather different approach and analyses how hard one should negotiate when there are other parties who may enter the deal. The general finding is that one should follow the crowd and act the same way as everyone else. All three chapters heavily use the mathematical tool of game theory. However, while Chapter 1 uses non-cooperative game theory, the analysis of Chapters 2 and 3 primarily use evolutionary game theory.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:644936 |
| Date | January 2014 |
| Creators | Massey, James |
| Publisher | University of Warwick |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/67175/ |
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