This thesis consists of three chapters of independent studies. In Chapter 1, I develop a finite two-stage game model where consumers in new export markets lack information about their own valuation for the quality of a new product. The model is then used to examine firms' quality choices. With asymmetric information, the need to establish a quality reputation may not be sufficient to induce firms to choose high quality. The likelihood that a firm will choose to export a high-quality product rather than a lower-quality variant increases with the number of experienced consumers. However, it decreases with the number of competing firms. A policy of subsidising exporters can encourage firms to select high quality and promote consumer experience, and thus establish an independently viable high-quality export market. Nevertheless, this will only work if the subsidy is conditional on quality choice. That is, the administrative monitoring of quality is required. Beside, the government may temporarily limit the number of competing firms. If consumers in new export markets possess information about their own valuation, it may be possible to promote the transition to a viable high-quality export market by competition policy alone. In Chapter 2, I employ a simple take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game with two-sided asymmetric information to reconcile the theoretical results with ob- servation. With two-sided asymmetric information, the probability of bargaining failure is positive. The likelihood that the domestic and foreign firm will collude increases with the probability of a high-type foreign firm but decreases with the bargaining power and concentration level of the domestic firm. The small number of private settlements indicates the inefficient outcome of the bargain- ing game with asymmetric information rather than evidence of the antidumping measure being less misused as a collusive tool. In Chapter 3, I examine the behaviour of firms after the implementation of an FTA by paying attention to the impacts of rules of origin on preferential trade ows and economic activities within the FTA region. It is found that a tightening of the rules of origin increases the volume of final goods import from RoW but decreases the volume of intermediate goods and raw material import from RoW, given the dominance of the final goods rules of origin effects. However, if the intermediate goods rules of origin effects dominate, the volume of intermediate goods import from RoW turns to increase, rather than decrease. These imply that preferential trade ows and economic activities among the member countries of an FTA may increase or decrease when the rules of origin are tightened. The findings, inter alia, suggest that the product-specific rules of origin that impose the restrictive rules to final goods but the loose rules to intermediate goods are more efficient in promoting preferential trade and economic activities within the region and also inducing investments from outside.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:582215 |
| Date | January 2012 |
| Creators | Bumrungsuk, Chutamas |
| Publisher | University of Warwick |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/55923/ |
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