The aim of the thesis is to systematically present, analyse and critically reflect Hans Jonas's (1903-1993) conception of moral responsibility with respect to his axiological ontology, anthropology, speculative theology and conception of modern technology with account of the most important topically relevant German secondary sources, including the latest ones. The first chapter maps the relevant Czech and Slovak secondary sources, whereby it evaluates to what extent Jonas's ethics of responsibility represented a general or applied approach, whether it was only an ethics of survival and whether in this context Jonas's thinking can be labelled anthropocentric. The second chapter offers insight primarily into Jonas's ethical thought in the chronological context of his life. The third chapter analyses Jonas's axiological ontology, anthropology, speculative theology and conception of modern technology. Against this philosophical and speculative-theological background the fourth chapter critically examines Jonas's conception of moral responsibility proper. The fifth chapter critically reflects on both the philosophical and speculative-theological background of Jonas's conceptions of responsibility and the conception itself. An excursus into applied ethics, which concludes the fifth chapter and the work as a whole, finally solves a topical ethical challenge in the sphere of assisted reproduction having to do with the categorical imperative of Jonas's responsibility for future generations. The main results of critical analysis and reflection: Jonas's ethics of responsibility is a supplementary applied conception, an ethics of survival, whose normative axiom commands the preservation (perpetuation) of the human capacity to responsibility. Jonas's thought is monistically anthropocentric. That follows from Jonas's integral monism, in which the difference between god and world, spirit and matter, reality and possibility is levelled out. These monistic confusions are more or less also projected into the ethical points of departure of Jonas's conception of responsibility, especially his specific axiological onto(theo)logy, in which the difference between ontology and axiology is levelled out. The main characteristic of Jonas's proper conception of responsibility consists in confusion (identification) of the object of responsibility with the instance of responsibility - from which at the level of theory of responsibility Jonas's specific two-place relationship of responsibility (subject - object=instance) follows. Although Jonas within his ethics of responsibility, in order to justify responsibility for future generations, broadened his specific two-place relationship to a three-place one, the author of this thesis finds none of the versions of Jonas's three-place relationship plausible - though the author agrees that an at least three-place conception of responsibility is necessary (instance - subject - object). However, for a more differentiated analysis of responsibility a five-place conception is suitable (normative standard - instance - subject - action - object affected by the action), with respect to the possibility of solving some of the problems of Jonas's responsibility for future generations a six-place conception (last instance - normative standard - instance - subject - action - object affected by the action).
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:253424 |
| Date | January 2016 |
| Creators | ŠIMEK, Vojtěch |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | Czech |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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