Institutional theory is utilized to understand the role of the state in determining who among overlapping professions are allowed to compete in healthcare markets. Hypotheses are tested using a professional licensing policy innovation that influences the evolution of markets for healthcare services. This first paper demonstrates how the power of incumbent and challenging professional associations, the characteristics of a state's labor market, and previous adoptions by neighboring states affect a state's propensity to embrace or resist state legislation of professionally-contested healthcare licensing legislation over a 10-year observation period. The results of this research have implications for understanding state healthcare market innovations, the power of professional associations, and institutional theory. Two subsequent papers address the effects of this competition on training programs in the challenging profession.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:arizona.edu/oai:arizona.openrepository.com:10150/578634 |
Date | January 2015 |
Creators | Feyereisen, Scott L. |
Contributors | Jaquette, Ozan, Jaquette, Ozan, Broschak, Joseph, Rhoades, Gary |
Publisher | The University of Arizona. |
Source Sets | University of Arizona |
Language | en_US |
Detected Language | English |
Type | text, Electronic Dissertation |
Rights | Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. |
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