The argument of this thesis is that Heideggerian individuation does not constitute another form of solipsism and is not incongruent with Heidegger???s account of Mitsein (beingwith). By demonstrating how individuation is bound up with Mitsein I will also argue that this concept of individuation contains an ethics, conceived here as responsibility for one???s Being/existence that nevertheless implicates others. By tracing the trajectory of Heidegger???s thinking from Being and Time to the later text, Time and Being, I want to suggest that the meditation on Being and its relation to Dasein as an individual contains an ethical moment. Ethics, not conceived of as a series of proscriptions, in terms of the Kantian Categorical Imperative for example. Nor ethics conceived in terms of an obligation to and responsibility for another, as in Levinasian ethics, but an ethics in terms of responsibility for existence, and more specifically, for one???s own existence. The ethical moment in Heidegger, I argue, is not one as ambitious as changing the world or assuming infinite and numerous obligations on behalf of others. It is, rather, a question of changing oneself. It is a question of assuming responsibility in response to the call of Being. I will show how, given that Dasein is always Mitsein, others are situated in such an ethics. Central to the thesis is an examination of the relation between indivduation and Mitsein. While Heidegger is always careful to distinguish his form of individuation from other accounts of individuation or solipsism, such as those of Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant or Edmund Husserl???s, Heidegger???s conception of solipsism and its relation to his account of Mitsein remains somewhat obscure. As a consequence, there are several problems that this concept raises, all of which have been the subject of much debate. At the centre of this debate is the apparent tension between the concept of individuation and the notion that ontologically, Dasein is also a Mitsein. This tension has led to a number of interpretations, which either argue that the concept of individuation is inconsistent with the notion of Mitsein, or that it constitutes yet another instance of Cartesian subjectivity and that as a consequence, it is inherently unethical. This thesis contributes to this debate by submitting that the concept of individuation, while primary or central to Heidegger???s ontology, is not in tension with his account of Mitsein. I use Jean-Luc Nancy???s paradoxical logic of the singular to argue for this claim. I suggest that it is precisely this concept of individuation that can inform an ethics and theory of political action on account of the emphasis on individual responsibility. The second part of my argument, also made with the aid of Nancy, is that this can inform an ethics and a theory of political action, not at level of making moral judgements, or yielding standards of right and wrong, but at the level of individual and by implication, collective responsibility for one???s own existence. Given that there is no real separation between the ontic and ontological levels in Heidegger???s work, a taking responsibility at the level of one???s own Being will invariably play itself out ontically in factical life in terms of moral responsibility and judgement. I explore the concrete political implications of this through an examination of Heidegger???s account of freedom. I argue that Heidegger???s removal of freedom from the ontology of self-presence and his alternative conception of it provides us with a way of thinking freedom not in terms of a specific set of rights, but as a mode of being-in-theworld and as the basis for collective political action. I use the work of Hannah Arendt to develop a theory of political action, freedom and judgment from this revisionary conception of freedom.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ADTP/258871 |
| Date | January 2005 |
| Creators | Sorial, Sarah, School of Philosophy, UNSW |
| Publisher | Awarded by:University of New South Wales. School of Philosophy |
| Source Sets | Australiasian Digital Theses Program |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Rights | Copyright Sarah Sorial, http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/copyright |
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