In this dissertation I argue that Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics is our best understanding of morality, but that as it stands it has some serious deficiencies that need to be overcome before it can live up to its own promise. In particular, its insistence that facts, norms and self-expressions constitute the full range of validity claims available to us privileges Western voices in discourse, and undermines its own principles of equality and coercion-free dialogue. According to Habermas, others who do not utilise validity claims in the same way that Western speakers do are merely blurring the lines between these three categories and hence fall short of the ideal practices of discourse. In other words, they are less than fully rational.
Rather, I argue that these three categories do not exhaust the full range of possible reasons. I suggest that we ought to understand statements that do not fit as one of these kinds of validity claim as instances of different kinds of claims entirely. Instead of being a confused blurring-of-the-lines, expressions on the part of indigenous and “traditional” societies that do not conform to Habermas’ categories of fact, norm or self-expression are just as likely to be instances of an expanded ontology of reasons that are equally legitimate.
After examining some alternative explanations regarding claims that do not fit into Habermas’ categories, I finally suggest and describe a different, place-based kind of validity claim that I refer to as “ecological truth”, and suggest that it shows up the limitations of Habermas’ ontology of reasons. Ecological truth is a potential kind of reason available in discourse that is rooted in a close intertwining of practices and communities with particular ecologies and environments. This kind of reason cannot be subsumed into the categories of fact, norm and self-expression. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This dissertation argues for a method of resolving moral disagreement by the exchange of reasons by those affected by the disagreement under certain conditions. However, it suggests that typical Western accounts of the varieties of reasons admissible in these kind of conversations is limited, privileges Western ways of looking at the world, and devalues non-Western and, in the focus of this dissertation, particularly indigenous worldviews. As such, a fuller and more just account of reason is needed, one that includes the kinds of reasons used by all, if we are to have just, fair and equitable conversations in order to resolve moral disagreements.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:mcmaster.ca/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/18777 |
| Date | January 2016 |
| Creators | Hemmingsen, Michael |
| Contributors | Igneski, Violetta, Philosophy |
| Source Sets | McMaster University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
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