Emmanuel Levinas on human freedom and relation to the other Ján Hreško ABSTRACT This dissertation deals with the philosophical problem of human freedom from an intersubjective and ethical point of view. It interprets and elaborates Emmanuel Levinas' understanding of freedom and shows that he paid considerable attention to this issue in his works. The thesis is based primarily on the formulation of this problem in his main post-war works but makes its thematic elaboration. It shows what role freedom plays within his ethics and its key ideas. The research follows the constitution of freedom of the corporal and economic being. It explains the criticism of freedom, the argument of justifying freedom and finally its investiture. Separately it focuses on the question of human position in history. Finally, it clarifies Levinas' main claim that responsibility precedes freedom. At the same time, it asks: In what sense did Levinas understand the ambiguous concept of freedom? Are there more notions of freedom? What is the relationship between my freedom and the freedom of the other? What does it mean that acceptance of ethical demand does not depend on my will or choice? And what is the positive significance of responsibility for the other? The main thesis of this work can be expressed as follows: according to...
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:434985 |
| Date | January 2020 |
| Creators | Hreško, Ján |
| Contributors | Pelcová, Naděžda, Sokol, Jan, Vogel, Jiří |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | Slovak |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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