This paper uses an overlapping generation model with uncertainty and endogenous fertility to study households¡¦ educational and investment choices. Individuals are assumed to be selfish and the intra-family deals are ruled by a self-enforcing ¡¥family constitution¡¦. Within this framework, parents finance their children¡¦s education inasmuch as they receive a return (a share of the increased earnings accruing to the children) and degree of risk aversion. And we show that the effect of social security on fertility and saving is analyzed both in the absence and in the presence of a perfect capital market. The impact on family's decision of the ability of the bargaining power is one of the focal points that this text is discussed, too. We also show that under this arrangement, individuals purchase less education than socially optimal. This yields a rationale for public action, either via public provision or via subsidization. We analyses both policies and find that they have different implications for households¡¦ fertility decisions. In particular, subsidization should be preferred if we wish to keep the rate of population growth as high as possible.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0629105-220901 |
| Date | 29 June 2005 |
| Creators | Sun, Jia-hong |
| Contributors | Tru-Gin Lau, Chi-Chu Chou, Shan-nonChin |
| Publisher | NSYSU |
| Source Sets | NSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
| Language | Cholon |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0629105-220901 |
| Rights | campus_withheld, Copyright information available at source archive |
Page generated in 0.0053 seconds