I examine the presence of earnings management at pre-IPO and lockup periods. Motivated by significant post-lockup insider sales documented in prior research, I investigate whether insiders (managers and venture capitalists) inflate earnings around the lockup period in order to increase share price and maximize personal wealth from selling shares at lockup expiration. I also compare levels of earnings management in the pre-IPO and lockup periods with those in the post-lockup period. Prior research also documents that auditor quality mitigates earnings management behavior. I explore the impact of auditor quality in the unique setting of IPO lockups. ... Cross-sectional analysis reveals that my sample IPO firms also utilize real-activities manipulation, but only in the early pre-IPO period. The results are robust with respect to alternative abnormal accruals and real-activities measures. I also find that IPO firms that hire prestigious auditors experience less earnings management in the lockup period than firms with lower-quality auditors, after controlling for the monitoring role of venture capitalist and underwriter reputation. / by Lizhong Hao. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2013. / Includes bibliography. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / System requirements: Adobe Reader.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:fau.edu/oai:fau.digital.flvc.org:fau_4184 |
| Contributors | Hao, Lizhong., College of Business, School of Accounting |
| Publisher | Florida Atlantic University |
| Source Sets | Florida Atlantic University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | xi, 114 p. : ill. (some col.), electronic |
| Rights | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
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