This thesis consists of five papers, presented as separate chapters within three parts: Industrial Organization, Evolutionary Game Theory and Game Theory. The common basis of these parts is research in the field of game theory and more specifically, equilibrium selection in different frameworks. The first part, Industrial Organization, consists of one paper co-authored with Prajit Dutta and Jörgen Weibull. Forward-looking consumers are analysed in a Bertrand framework. It is assumed that if firms can anticipate a price war and act accordingly, so can consumers. The second part, Evolutionary Game Theory, contains three chapters. All models in these papers are based on Young’s (1993, 1998) approach. In Chapter 2, the Saez Marti and Weibull’s (1999) model is generalized from the Nash Demand Game to generic two-player games. In Chapter 3, co-authored with Jens Josephson, a special set of stochastically stable states is introduced, minimal construction, which is the long-run prediction under imitation behavior in normal form games. In Chapter 4, best reply and imitation rules are considered on extensive form games with perfect information. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk., 2001
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:hhs-604 |
| Date | January 2001 |
| Creators | Matros, Alexander |
| Publisher | Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Samhällsekonomi (S), Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics [Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögskolan] (EFI) |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary, info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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