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A stochastic game of hiring and firing

We study a stochastic game of hiring and firing in which the employee has a random capacity which is not directly observable for the employer, and only par- tially observable for the employee. In this setting, we derive a Nash Equilibrium of strategies.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-507239
Date January 2023
CreatorsAn, Yoo-An
PublisherUppsala universitet, Sannolikhetsteori och kombinatorik
Source SetsDiVA Archive at Upsalla University
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeStudent thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text
Formatapplication/pdf
Rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
RelationU.U.D.M. project report ; U.U.D.M. Project Report 2023:25

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