Indirect reciprocity describes a class of reputation-based mechanisms which
may explain the prevalence of cooperation in large groups where partners meet only once.
The first model for which this has been demonstrated was the image scoring mechanism.
But analytical work on the simplest possible case, the binary scoring model, has shown
that even small errors in implementation destabilize any cooperative regime. It has
thus been claimed that for indirect reciprocity to stabilize cooperation, assessments of
reputation must be based on higher-order information. Is indirect reciprocity relying
on frst-order information doomed to fail? We use a simple analytical model of image
scoring to show that this need not be the case. Indeed, in the general image scoring
model the introduction of implementation errors has just the opposite effect as in the
binary scoring model: it may stabilize instead of destabilize cooperation.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VIENNA/oai:epub.wu-wien.ac.at:5067 |
| Date | 07 1900 |
| Creators | Berger, Ulrich, Grüne, Ansgar |
| Publisher | Elsevier |
| Source Sets | Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Article, PeerReviewed |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Relation | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.003, http://www.elsevier.com, http://epub.wu.ac.at/5067/ |
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