<p>In this master thesis we have presented a security analysis of the TLS protocol with particular emphasis on the recently discovered renegotiation attack. From our security proof we get that the Handshake protocol with renegotiation, including the fix from IETF, is secure, and hence not vulnerable to the renegotiation attack anymore. We have also analysed the Handshake protocol with session resumption, and the Application data protocol together with the Record protocol. Both of these protocols were deemed secure as well. All the security proofs are based on the UC (Universal Composability) security framework.</p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA/oai:DiVA.org:ntnu-10025 |
| Date | January 2010 |
| Creators | Firing, Tia Helene |
| Publisher | Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Department of Mathematical Sciences, Institutt for matematiske fag |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, text |
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