The objectives of the research are to: (1) Model and analyse the unique risk relationship between senior management and labour in environmental management; (2) Analyse various contractual mechanisms and compensation schemes that reduce the human resource management risk and minimise the dissonance between profit and stewardship goals; (3) Analyse the implications of the performance measurement problem on the principal-agent contract and the efficient delivery of abatement. / Chapter 2 reviews literature pertinent to environmental management and the application of principal-agent theory. Chapter 3, entitled "Environmental Management Systems and the Intra-Firm Risk Relationship" is an analysis of the role of these incentives and risk-sharing mechanisms in decreasing environmental risk exposure and achieving stewardship. Chapter 4, entitled "Incentive Contracts and Environmental Performance Indicators" focuses on the problem of environmental performance measurement and its impact on the P-A contract and on the efficient delivery of abatement. In chapter 5, general conclusions and suggestions for further research are discussed. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.30340 |
| Date | January 1999 |
| Creators | Basak, Rishi. |
| Contributors | Goldsmith, Peter Daniel (advisor) |
| Publisher | McGill University |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Coverage | Master of Science (Department of Agricultural Economics.) |
| Rights | All items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated. |
| Relation | alephsysno: 001744260, proquestno: MQ64316, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest. |
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