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The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: Evidence from panel data

Yes / We examine the effects of banking supervisory architecture on central bank preferences, quantified
through a recently proposed measure of central bank conservatism. Using a dynamic panel data specification we document that central banks serving both monetary policy and banking supervision functions are less inflation conservative than those with only a price stability mandate.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:BRADFORD/oai:bradscholars.brad.ac.uk:10454/8307
Date01 November 2016
CreatorsChortareas, G., Logothetis, V., Magkonis, Georgios, Zekente, K.
Source SetsBradford Scholars
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeArticle, Accepted manuscript
Rights© 2016 Elsevier. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

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