The audit firms play an important role in the capital markets by verifying that auditors provide reliable information to the decision makers. However, trust in auditing firms has been questioned following Enron‘s failure and accounting scandals at WorldCom and other companies. As a result, Arthur Anderson failed and the number of big audit firms fell to four firms and no one knows who might be next. Defond and Francis (2005) believe that a critical trigger occurred when Deloitte & Touch issued a “clean” peer review report on Arthur Andersen in December 2001, just a few weeks before Andersen publicly announced that it had shredded documents related to Enron audit. The credibility and integrity of the profession‘s self-regulation program was immediately in doubt. To protect public interests and to restore confidence in the capital markets, the USA government issued the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. Similarly, the Financial Reporting Council in the UK provided the Professional Oversight Board with similar mission. This thesis aims to explore the role of independent audit regulators in promoting confidence in the audit profession, and analyse the big four firms’ strategies that react toward these regulatory changes in the audit markets. The lack of studies in this area supports the use of grounded theory as a research methodology. 24 semi-structured interviews were conducted with the top management level of the audit regulators and big four firms’ partners. This study contributes to the literature as it provides a better understanding of the satisfaction of the big four audit firms toward the new independent regulators, and how these firms react toward the additional requirements of the independent inspectors.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:573569 |
| Date | January 2012 |
| Creators | Eldaly, Mohamed Khaled |
| Publisher | University of Bedfordshire |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://hdl.handle.net/10547/294283 |
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