Prior to the announcement of a merger or acquisition, the stock price of the target company often experiences a price run-up prior to the announcement of the transaction. This price run-up can be attributed to information leakage and insider trading. This paper examines how changes in the SEC’s budget effects the pre-announcement price run-up of mergers and acquisitions. Furthermore, this paper explores the political processes surrounding SEC budgeting, as well as flaws in the current system. This paper finds that with a $10 million increase in the SEC’s budget, the average pre-announcement run-up ratio decreases by 0.3%. The findings of this paper suggest a concrete means of reducing insider trading, dependent on an increase in SEC budget.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:scholarship.claremont.edu:cmc_theses-2643 |
| Date | 01 January 2017 |
| Creators | Stastny, Connor |
| Publisher | Scholarship @ Claremont |
| Source Sets | Claremont Colleges |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | CMC Senior Theses |
| Rights | © 2017 Connor D Stastny, default |
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