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Essays on strategic trading, asymmetric information, and asset pricing

This thesis presents three models of asset pricing involving non-competitive behavior and asymmetric
information. In the first model, a risk averse investor with private information about
dividends trades shares over an infinite time horizon with risk neutral uninformed agents. The
informed investor trades strategically in equilibrium. The second model also involves an infinite
time horizon, but all agents are risk averse and equally informed about dividends. Non-competitive
behavior is exogenously specified; price takers trade shares with a strategic investor
who accounts for the effects of her trades on the stock price. In this case, an endogenous information
asymmetry arises in equilibrium. Closed form equilibria are derived for both models and
implications for price dynamics are explored. While the first model constitutes a new extension
of the multiperiod Kyle model of insider trading, the second model generates more interesting
price dynamics. If the strategic investor manages a large mutual fund, significant risk premia
and price volatility may arise in equilibrium. In fact, if mutual fund participation is sufficiently
widespread, multiple equilibria may exist. The third model extends the multiperiod Kyle model
to a case where the insider observes a noisy signal of the stock's terminal liquidation value. An
equilibrium much like Kyle's is derived. Price tends toward value over time, and stock price
volatility depends on both the drift and volatility of the insider's private signal. Like the Kyle
model, the insider's trading activity leaves no detectable trace in trading volume, expected
returns, or price volatility. / Business, Sauder School of / Finance, Division of / Graduate

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:UBC/oai:circle.library.ubc.ca:2429/9910
Date05 1900
CreatorsPeterson, David John
Source SetsUniversity of British Columbia
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeText, Thesis/Dissertation
Format4456095 bytes, application/pdf
RightsFor non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.

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