This study provides an insight into the behavior of foreign institutional investors in Swedish corporate governance matters. We look at the presence of foreign institutional investors on the Swedish nomination committee and their voting power, to show their influence on board independence in Sweden. Collecting data for two years that is 2018 and 2019, from Swedish firms listed on the Swedish stock exchange markets, and analyze the data using the panel regression analysis. The result shows that foreign institutional investors only influence board independence in Sweden when a controlling owner has more than 50 % of the voting right. Also, we show that foreign institutional investors generally have little or no influence on the number of independent directors on Swedish listed firms. However, it is the controlling owners and the board sizes that significantly determine the level of board independence in Sweden. This study concluded that for foreign institutional investors to influence board independence they should participate on the nomination committee.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:lnu-95908 |
| Date | January 2020 |
| Creators | Mandaza, Kudzai, Mirad, Neba |
| Publisher | Linnéuniversitetet, Institutionen för ekonomistyrning och logistik (ELO), Linnéuniversitetet, Institutionen för ekonomistyrning och logistik (ELO) |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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