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Using Smart Scheduling to Reduce the Negative Impacts of Instrumentation-based Defenses on Embedded Systems

Real-time embedded systems can be found in a large number of devices we use, including safety-critical systems. Useful for their small size and low power consumption, they are also harder to protect against state-of-the-art attacks than general purpose systems due to their lack of hardware features. Even current defenses may not be applicable since instrumentation added to defend real-time embedded systems may cause them to miss their deadlines, rending them inoperable. We show that the static properties obtained by the scheduling policies can be used as security guarantees for the tasks composing the program. By completely securing a subset of the tasks of the program only using the scheduler policy, we remove the need to add external instrumentation on these tasks, reducing the amount of extra instructions needed to entirely protect the system. With less instrumentation, the overhead added by the defenses is reduced and can therefore be applied to a larger number of systems.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:wpi.edu/oai:digitalcommons.wpi.edu:etd-theses-2285
Date18 April 2019
CreatorsLe Baron, Thomas
ContributorsRobert J. Walls, Advisor, Craig Shue, Reader, Craig E. Wills, Reader
PublisherDigital WPI
Source SetsWorcester Polytechnic Institute
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
SourceMasters Theses (All Theses, All Years)

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