The majority of wheat research in the world and in Canada is conducted by the public sector. The government of Canada has introduced legislation to update its plant breeder’s rights (PBR) legislation, making Canada compliant with the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) 91 convention, with the goal to stimulate private investment in wheat variety research. International experience with UPOV 91 reveals a wide range of outcomes depending on the specific royalty setting mechanisms allowed within their domestic legislation.
This thesis compares Canada’s existing policy to three very different international examples (France, United Kingdom, and Australia) of UPOV 91 compliant royalty collection systems for wheat. The model presented is one of a monopolistic competitive wheat-breeding industry with the introduction of a new certified seed variety. Farmers have the option to use farm saved seed (FSS) or certified seed on their farm. The additional economic benefit created from the innovation and its distribution is analyzed and interpreted for both, farmers (social benefit) and breeders (private benefit).
The results of the analysis show that while each UPOV 91 compliant model generates more revenue for farmers and breeders than Canada’s current policy, they tend to generate less than expected revenue in the short-run. If a country has strong intellectual property rights (IPRs), it will attract some domestic and foreign investment and possibly a beneficial collaboration between the public, private, and producer sector, also known as P4 (public-private-producer-partnerships).
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:USASK/oai:ecommons.usask.ca:10388/ETD-2014-09-1756 |
| Date | 2014 September 1900 |
| Contributors | Gray, Richard S. |
| Source Sets | University of Saskatchewan Library |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text, thesis |
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