La thèse analyse la question de la stabilité du système financier international dans son ensemble et plus précisément comment améliorer sa résilience. Chaque chapitre se focalise sur un type d'acteur dans ce système complexe, à savoir les banques, les organismes de supervision et les régulateurs internationaux. Le premier chapitre introduit de nouvelles techniques d'optimisation pour accélérer le calcul de mesure de risque dans les banques et les institutions financières. Il propose également une étude théorique pour valider les algorithmes d'optimisation proposés. Le second vise à quantifier l'externalité négative générée par les activités d'une banque ou d'une d'institution financière. Finalement, le dernier chapitre concerne la coopération entre régulateurs nationaux en présence de coûts de coordination en proposant une analyse qui s'appuie sur la théorie des jeux. / We first investigate the computational complexity for estimating quantile based risk measures, such as the widespread Value at Risk for banks and Solvency II capital requirements for insurance companies, via nested Monte Carlo simulations. The estimator is a conditional expectation type estimate where two stage simulations are required to evaluate the risk measure: an outer simulation is used to generate risk factor scenarios that govern price movements and an inner simulation is used to evaluate the future portfolio value based on each of those scenarios. The second essay considers the financial stability from a macro perspective. Measuring negative externalities of banks is a major challenge for financial regulators. We propose a new risk management approach to enhance the financial stability and to increase the fairness of financial transactions. The basic idea is that a bank should assume as much risk as it creates. Any imbalance in the tails of the distribution of profit and losses is a sign of the bank's failure to internalize its externalities or the social costs associated with its activities. The aim of the third essay is to find a theoretical justification toward the mutual benefits for members of a bonking union in the context of a strategic interaction model. We use a unique contagion dynamic that marries the rich literature of game theory, contagion in pandemic crisis and the study of collaboration between regulators. The model is focused toward regulating asset classes, not individual banks. This special design addresses moral hazard issues that could result from government intervention in the case of crisis.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:theses.fr/2017PA01E003 |
| Date | 04 July 2017 |
| Creators | Ben Hadj, Saifeddine |
| Contributors | Paris 1, Université catholique de Louvain (1970-....), Gillet, Roland, Platten, Isabelle |
| Source Sets | Dépôt national des thèses électroniques françaises |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, Text |
Page generated in 0.0021 seconds