The current Internet is a hierarchical architecture comprising heterogeneous entities of privately owned infrastructures, where higher tier Internet service providers (ISPs) supply connectivity to the lower tier ISPs and charge them for the transit service. One of the most challenging problems service providers facing today is how to increase the profitability while maintaining good service qualities as the network scales up. For the higher tier ISPs, the main concern is how to increase the profit by attracting more lower tier ISPs (or traffic), while the lower tier ISPs concern about the connectivity, quality of service as well as the cost of the transit service. In this thesis, we seek to understand the interaction between different hierarchies of ISPs. Note that the lower tier ISPs can transmit traffic to each other, either by purchasing the service from higher tier ISPs, or by setting "private peering links" between themselves. Higher tier ISPs, on the other hand, cannot charge the transit service at will since there is competition among higher tier ISPs. We model the interaction of these ISPs via a game theoretic approach. Under this competitive framework, we study the issues of (a) impact of private peering relationship among the lower tier ISPs, (b) resource allocation of the higher tier ISPs so that resource monopoly can be avoided, (c) under a competitive market, how can the higher tier ISPs perform revenue maximization, and (d) conditions wherein higher tier ISPs are willing to perform network upgrade when we scale up the network size. We divide the above investigation into single higher tier ISP and multiple higher tier ISPs scenarios. In each scenario, firstly, a generalized model is presented to characterize the behaviors of the lower tier and higher tier ISPs, in which their economic interests are reflected. We study how a lower tier ISP can distributively determine its optimal routing strategy. Furthermore, we show how a higher tier ISP is able to utilize the available information to infer its optimal pricing strategy, under which a revenue maximization is achieved. Two distributed algorithms are proposed to help them to provide a fair and efficient bandwidth allocation to lower tier ISPs. Last but not least, we investigate the above issues in a many-ISPs-regime, i.e. we scale up the network size. Our mathematical framework provides insights on the interaction among ISPs and show these ISPs can still gain profits as they upgrade the network infrastructures. Extensive simulations are carried out to quantify and support our theoretical claims. / Lee Cheuk Man. / "February 2008." / Adviser: John C. S. Lui. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-08, Section: B, page: 4849. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 104-109). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_344121 |
Date | January 2008 |
Contributors | Lee, Cheuk Man., Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Computer Science and Engineering. |
Source Sets | The Chinese University of Hong Kong |
Language | English, Chinese |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Text, theses |
Format | electronic resource, microform, microfiche, 1 online resource (xi, 109 p. : ill.) |
Rights | Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) |
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