Law Wing Fai. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [151]-156). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / ABSTRACT --- p.I / 摘要 --- p.II / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.III / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.IV / Chapter CHAPTER ONE --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Background --- p.1 / Purpose --- p.3 / Organization --- p.4 / Chapter CHAPTER TWO --- REVIEW OF THEORIES AND LITERATURE --- p.5 / The Literature on Foreign Direct Investment --- p.5 / The Literature on Legal Issues --- p.10 / Chapter CHAPTER THREE --- METHODOLOGY --- p.17 / Data Collection --- p.17 / Control Variables in Detail --- p.20 / Design of Regression Models --- p.26 / Methodology --- p.28 / Chapter CHAPTER FOUR --- THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL FACTORS ON INVESTMENT MODE SELECTION --- p.29 / Rationale for the Study --- p.29 / Fundamental Differences between Partial Acquisition and JV --- p.30 / Importance of Legal Institutions in the Choice of M&A and JV --- p.33 / Hypothesis on the Effects of Legal Factors on Investment Mode Selection --- p.34 / Hypothesis on Legal Origin --- p.34 / Hypothesis on Shareholder Protection --- p.36 / Hypothesis on the Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.39 / Hypothesis on Securities Regulation --- p.42 / Hypothesis on Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency --- p.42 / Hypothesis on Other Legal Issues --- p.43 / Empirical Evidence for the Effects of Legal Factors on Investment Mode Selection --- p.45 / Legal Origin --- p.45 / Shareholder Protection --- p.48 / Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.50 / "Securities Regulation, Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency" --- p.52 / Other Legal Issues --- p.54 / Chapter CHAPTER FIVE --- THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL FACTORS ON OWNERSHIP PROPORTION DECISION --- p.57 / Rationale for the Study --- p.57 / Hypothesis on the Effects of Legal Factors on Ownership Proportion Decision --- p.57 / Hypothesis on Legal Origin --- p.59 / Hypothesis on Shareholder Protection --- p.59 / Hypothesis on Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.59 / Hypothesis on Securities Regulation --- p.60 / Hypothesis on Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency --- p.60 / Hypothesis on Legal Origin --- p.60 / Hypothesis on Shareholder Protection --- p.60 / Hypothesis on Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.61 / Hypothesis on Securities Regulation --- p.61 / Hypothesis on Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency --- p.61 / Hypothesis on Other Legal Issues --- p.61 / Empirical Evidence for the Effects of Legal Factors on Ownership Proportion Decision --- p.63 / Legal Origin --- p.63 / Shareholder Protection --- p.65 / Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.66 / "Securities Regulation, Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency" --- p.67 / Other Legal Issues --- p.68 / Chapter CHAPTER SIX --- DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION --- p.70 / TABLE --- p.73 / Table 1: The Variables --- p.73 / Table 2: Shareholder protection around the world --- p.82 / Table 3: Government enforcement efficiency around the world --- p.85 / "Table 4: Accounting standard, corporate transparency, securities regulation, mandatory bid rule and cross-border regulation around the world" --- p.88 / Table 5A: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection --- p.91 / Table 5B: Effect of shareholder protection on investment mode selection --- p.93 / Table 5C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on investment mode selection --- p.95 / "Table 5D: Effect of securities regulation, accounting standard and corporate transparency on investment mode selection" --- p.97 / Table 5E: Effect of other legal issues on investment mode selection --- p.99 / Table 6A: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion) --- p.101 / Table 6B: Effect of shareholder protection on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion) --- p.103 / Table 6C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion) --- p.105 / "Table 6D: Effect of securities regulation, accounting standard and corporate transparency on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion)" --- p.107 / Table 6E: Effect of other legal issues on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion) --- p.109 / Table 7A: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection (Majority ownership sample) --- p.111 / Table 7b: Effect of shareholder protection on investment mode selection (Majority ownership sample) --- p.113 / Table 7C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on investment mode selection (majority ownership sample) --- p.115 / "Table 7D: Effect of shareholder protection, accounting standard and corporate transparency on investment mode selection (majority ownership sample)" --- p.117 / Table 7E: Effect of other legal issues on investment mode selection (Majority ownership sample) --- p.119 / Table 8 A: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection (Minority ownership sample) --- p.121 / Table 8B: Effect of shareholder protection on investment mode selection (Minority ownership sample) --- p.123 / Table 8C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on investment mode selection (minority ownership sample) --- p.125 / Table 8D: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection (Minority ownership sample) --- p.127 / Table 8E: Effect of other legal issues on investment mode selection (Minority ownership sample) --- p.129 / Table 9A: Effect of legal origin on ownership proportion selection (M&A sample) --- p.131 / Table 9b: Effect of shareholder protection on ownership proportion selection (M&A sample) --- p.133 / Table 9C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on ownership proportion selection (M&A sample) --- p.135 / "Table 9D: Effect of securities regulation, accounting standard and corporate transparency on ownership proportion selection (m&a sample)" --- p.137 / Table 9E: Effect of other legal issues on ownership proportion selection (M&A sample) --- p.139 / Table 10A: Effect of legal origin on ownership proportion selection (JV sample) --- p.141 / Table 10B: Effect of shareholder protection on ownership proportion selection (JV sample) --- p.143 / Table 10C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on ownership proportion selection (jv sample) --- p.145 / "Table 10D: Effect of securities regulation, accounting standard and corporate transparency on ownership proportion selection (jv sample)" --- p.147 / Table 10E: Effect of other legal issues on ownership proportion selection (jv sample) --- p.149 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.151 / APPENDIX --- p.157 / Appendix 1: Summary statistics of the variables used in investigation of investment mode selection --- p.157 / Appendix 2: Summary statistics of the variables used in investigation of ownership proportion selection (m&a sample) --- p.159 / Appendix 3: Summary statistics of the variables used in investigation of ownership proportion selection (JV sample) --- p.161 / "Appendix 4: Correlations of Shareholder Protection, Corporate Transparency, Securities Regulation and other legal issues" --- p.163 / "Appendix 5: Correlations of Shareholder Protection, Government Enforcement Efficiency, Corporate Transparency, Securities Regulation and other legal issues" --- p.164 / "Appendix 6: Correlations of Shareholder Protection, Government Enforcement Efficiency and other legal issues" --- p.165 / Appendix 7: Correlations of firm-level and country-level control variables --- p.166
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_325276 |
| Date | January 2005 |
| Contributors | Law, Wing Fai., Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Economics. |
| Source Sets | The Chinese University of Hong Kong |
| Language | English, Chinese |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, bibliography |
| Format | print, viii, 162 leaves : ill. ; 30 cm. |
| Coverage | United States |
| Rights | Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) |
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