In their negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between 2011 and 2016, the European Union and the United States of America (U.S.) aimed to not only reduce tariffs but to also establish regulatory coherence. For the U.S. federal states, the proposed comprehensive deal could offer both possibilities to expand transatlantic trade as well as threats to their legislative authority. This study investigates why and how some states represent their transatlantic trade promotion and trade policy interests despite constitutional limitations, why there is variation regarding these two topics of states’ interest representation and what intergovernmental conflicts arise. Based on original qualitative expert interviews, the analysis shows that U.S. states as noncentral governments are viable actors in transatlantic trade and investment relations. It is evident that a small number of mostly progressive state legislators actively engage U.S. federal and European officials to prevent the loss of state regulatory authority. Regarding the proposed trade deal, interest representation is centered around issues of federalism and sovereignty rather than economic growth opportunities. While trade promotion remains the key driver of states’ overall transatlantic activities, these findings expand our view on states’ international affairs beyond economic development.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:columbia.edu/oai:academiccommons.columbia.edu:10.7916/D8HD9CB8 |
| Date | January 2018 |
| Creators | Jaursch, Julian |
| Source Sets | Columbia University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Theses |
Page generated in 0.0019 seconds