Moral Hazard and the Agency Costs thereof have long been accepted arguments in venture finance theory and have therefore long been accepted shortcomings in the venture capitalist / entrepreneur relationship. In psychological experiments ??? including economic ??? it has been shown that human beings prefer to act in a reciprocal manner that reduces any inequity in a relationship. Humans who expect to receive an unfair and inequitable position in a relationship, will take steps to rectify that position. Specifically, if a venture capitalist expects the entrepreneur to unfairly extract private benefits from the investee company post investment by the venture capitalist, then he or she will impose costly controls and monitoring mechanisms in place to prevent that. All relationships that impose controls and monitoring mechanisms are inefficient, as opposed to Advising the investee which draws upon the skills of the venture capitalist and is generally efficient. The venture capital industry is comprised of intelligent and professional people who can recognise inefficiency easily. Indeed, this is how they make poorly managed companies into profitable trade sales or IPO???s. The online survey completed for this thesis poses questions that attempt to show that venture capitalists and entrepreneurs are not locked in an antagonistic relationship where each merely acts in a self interested way. This thesis concludes that venture capitalists and entrepreneurs do work in a reciprocal relationship recognising the substantial efficiency gains to be made by doing so.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ADTP/186958 |
| Date | January 2005 |
| Creators | Thomson, Dean, Banking & Finance, Australian School of Business, UNSW |
| Publisher | Awarded by:University of New South Wales. School of Banking and Finance |
| Source Sets | Australiasian Digital Theses Program |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Rights | Copyright Dean Thomson, http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/copyright |
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