Cooperating in the Prisoner's Dilemma is irrational and some supporting mechanism is needed to stabilize cooperation. Indirect reciprocity based on reputation is
one such mechanism. Assessing an individual's reputation requires first-order information,
i.e. knowledge about its previous behavior, as it is utilized under image
scoring. But there seems to be an agreement that in order to successfully stabilize
cooperation, higher-order information is necessary, i.e. knowledge of others' previous
reputations. We show here that such a conclusion might have been premature.
Tolerant scoring, a first-order assessment rule with built-in tolerance against single
defections, can lead a society to stable cooperation. (author's abstract)
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VIENNA/oai:epub.wu-wien.ac.at:3273 |
| Date | 07 September 2010 |
| Creators | Berger, Ulrich |
| Publisher | Elsevier |
| Source Sets | Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Article, PeerReviewed |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Relation | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.009, http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/homepage.cws_home, http://epub.wu.ac.at/3273/ |
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