This dissertation is a study of Kohlberg's moral psychology, which is a six-stage
model of moral development. Kohlberg claims that his stages form a universal invariant
sequence and that they are hierarchical, i.e., higher stages are better than lower stages.
Accordingly, he claims that Stage 6 morality, which centers on justice, is universally
valid. This ethic of justice is embodied mainly in respect for persons, fairness, and the
procedural principle of ideal role taking. Kohlberg claims not only that Stage 6 values and
principles are universally valid, but also that they are determinate. In other words,
reasoning in terms of these values and principles guarantees that, for each particular
moral problem, there will be a distinct solution on which all morally mature people could
agree. By making these claims Kohlberg is advocating a strong and traditional version of
universalism, which I call 'paradigm universalism.'
The dissertation is divided into five chapters. In the first two chapters I outline
Kohlberg's theory and explore its philosophical implications. In Chapter 3 I discuss
Kohlberg's debates with two important critics, Gilligan and Flanagan. Gilligan claims
that Kohlberg's emphasis on justice rather than care indicates a gender bias in his model.
Flanagan, on the other hand, argues that since morality is multifarious it is wrong to
equate morality either with justice or care of a combination of both. While these criticism
do point out certain shortcomings of Kohlberg's theory, I argue that they do not seriously
threaten the universal validity of Stage 6 moral values and principles in general. Chapter
4 introduces the main philosophical arguments of this dissertation. In this chapter I argue
that (1) moral psychology is relevant to moral philosophy; (2) that the claim of hierarchy
for the Kohlbergian stages does receive significant support from his research; and therefore (3) Stage 6 does plausibly reflect certain universal moral ideals. At the same
time I allow (4) that there is clearly certain cultural bias in Kohlberg's theory and (5) that
he is excessively optimistic about the determinacy of Stage 6 moral reasoning. In the final
Chapter, I reflect on the universalism-relativism debate in light of Kohlberg's theory. I
argue that paradigm universalism is too strong for Kohlberg to support, and that
universalism is acceptable only in a weakened form which I call 'minimal universalism.'
Contrary to the hope of paradigm universalists, this minimal universalism cannot serve as
a comprehensive theory for solving moral problems. Neither does it exclude all forms of
ethical relativism, but it does set important limits to any acceptable relativist theory.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:BVAU.2429/8451 |
| Date | 11 1900 |
| Creators | Yeung, Kwok Wing Anthony |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Relation | UBC Retrospective Theses Digitization Project [http://www.library.ubc.ca/archives/retro_theses/] |
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