This research analyzes the long-lived public good/bad. The public good/bad is defined to ‘live long’ in the sense that the external effects of an action persist beyond the decision horizon of the actor. Thus, a very simple overlapping generations economy is modeled in which the agent lives for two periods while the public durable good/bad lasts indefinitely with deterioration/amelioration. Pareto optimality, the Lindahl equilibrium, and the theory of voluntary provision for this overlapping generations model are contrasted with those of the atemporal model. / Ph. D.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VTETD/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/53549 |
| Date | January 1988 |
| Creators | Kim, Jeong H. |
| Contributors | Economics, Moulin, Hervé, Cremer, Jacques, Gahvari, Firouz, Kaneko, Mamoru, Steinberg, Richard S. |
| Publisher | Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University |
| Source Sets | Virginia Tech Theses and Dissertation |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Dissertation, Text |
| Format | vi, 118 leaves, application/pdf, application/pdf |
| Rights | In Copyright, http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
| Relation | OCLC# 18690347 |
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