Lee, Hung Fei. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 67). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.P.1 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Reviews --- p.P.1 / Chapter 2.1 --- Sources of peer effect --- p.P.1 / Chapter 2.2 --- Peer pressure and contracts --- p.p.8 / Chapter 3 --- Model --- p.p.16 / Chapter 4 --- First Best Situation --- p.p.18 / Chapter 5 --- Revenue Sharing Contract under Peer Pressure --- p.p.20 / Chapter 5.1 --- No constraints on the fixed payments and commission rates --- p.p.21 / Chapter 5.2 --- "Negative fixed payment is allowed, but the sum of commission rates has to be less than 100%" --- p.p.24 / Chapter 5.3 --- Negative fixed payment is not allowed --- p.p.27 / Chapter 5.4 --- Implications on human resource investment --- p.p.31 / Chapter 5.5 --- Implications on players preference for a new member --- p.p.33 / Chapter 6 --- Fixed Wage Contract with Supervision under Peer Pressure --- p.p.33 / Chapter 6.1 --- No agent exceeding the target --- p.p.34 / Chapter 6.2 --- One agent exceeding the target --- p.p.40 / Chapter 6.3 --- Implications on human resource investment --- p.p.44 / Chapter 6.4 --- Implications on players' preference for a new member --- p.p.45 / Chapter 7 --- The Choice between Revenue Sharing and Fixed Wage --- p.p.46 / Chapter 8 --- Conclusion --- p.p.49 / Chapter 9 --- Appendix --- p.p.49
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_326846 |
Date | January 2009 |
Contributors | Lee, Hung Fei., Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Economics. |
Source Sets | The Chinese University of Hong Kong |
Language | English, Chinese |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Text, bibliography |
Format | print, 67 leaves : ill. ; 30 cm. |
Rights | Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) |
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