<p>There is a lack of applicable model for understanding stability affected by combination of incentive and direct control for an economic regulation within mixed-forms. The research on stability of an economic regulation has mostly been focused on incentive or direct control in a U-form or M-form dominated organization. Therefore, the purpose of this study has been to discover a universal model for explaining stability affected by combination theory, leading to high mixed-form organizations performance.</p><p>This dissertation illustrates the relative theories bound to the research topic and moves one step forward into hierarchies, the U-form dominated and M-form dominated mixed forms. And this dissertation puts forward a hypothesis on how to lead an economic regulation to more stable. The suggested theory was empirically tested in a case study and received strong support. The conclusion of the conducted research is that an economic regulation governed by an M-form dominated organization with stronger incentive and less direct control is more stable than a U-form dominated organization with weaker incentive and more direct control.</p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA/oai:DiVA.org:hkr-3451 |
| Date | January 2005 |
| Creators | Lou, Keke (Edward), Chen, Yong (Keven), Zhou, Lan (Julia) |
| Publisher | Kristianstad University College, Department of Business Administration, Kristianstad University College, Department of Business Administration, Kristianstad University College, Department of Business Administration |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, text |
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