In what follows I examine problems surrounding Barbara Herrnstein Smith's relativist conception of value in her book Contingencies of Value: Alternative Perspectives for Critical Theory. I begin by showing how her conception of value is comprised of two distinct philosophical claims: the first axiological and the second epistemological. She first presents an anti-objectivist argument for axiological relativism which is quite tenable. She then tries to gain further support for this position by putting forth a version of epistemological relativism, a move which not only fails, but if true would undermine even her relativist axiology. Once I have shown her constructivist position to be misleading, if not incoherent, I then reconsider what her axiological position would look like if it had the support of a more tenable epistemology. I therefore offer a conception of value, borrowed from Paul Grice's The Conception of Value and Allan Gibbard's Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, which argues from a realist epistemology yet accepts a significant degree of axiological relativism.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.56927 |
| Date | January 1992 |
| Creators | Doucette, Martin |
| Contributors | Livingston, Paisley (advisor) |
| Publisher | McGill University |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Coverage | Master of Arts (Department of English.) |
| Rights | All items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated. |
| Relation | alephsysno: 001325986, proquestno: AAIMM87651, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest. |
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