Return to search

中国地市官员籍贯与当地公共物品提供. / Hometown of prefectural officials and the provision of local public goods in contemporary China / CUHK electronic theses & dissertations collection / Zhongguo di shi guan yuan ji guan yu dang di gong gong wu pin ti gong.

对于转型期中国地方政府行为的研究,现有文献日益重视正式制度对官员行为的激励和约束作用:以GDP为标尺的相对绩效考核制度是改革开放后中国经济成功的决定因素,同时该正式制度也是地方政府忽视公共物品供给的重要原因。即使在考虑了正式制度及社会经济因素之后,本研究仍然观察到地方政府在公共物品供给水平上存在着显著的地区和时间差异。然而,对于此差异背后的决定因素,现有文献却考察不足。本文认为,非正式制度是造成该差异的原因。通过采用地区领导人籍贯作为非正式制度的代理并利用1990年至2010年的中国地级市数据,本研究系统检验了上述假设。本文发现,和来自外地的地方领导人相比,那些在其籍贯地任职的官员有更大的动力为本地区提供公共服务:本地籍贯的领导在基础教育、公共医疗和环境保护上的财政投入比重显著高于外地籍贯的领导。本研究同时发现,公共服务支出份额的增加是以基础设施建设支出的减少为代价的:本地籍贯官员对该项支出的投入比重显著低于外地籍贯官员。同时,利用省级数据及相同的模型设定,本文也发现非正式制度在省级行政单位依然发挥作用,但作用程度减弱。上述发现彰显出在一个正式制度主导的环境中,非正式制度依然发挥着显著的作用,并在一定程度上弥补了前者的不足。在实证发现的基础上,本研究又通过案例分析和访谈进一步考察了非正式制度发挥作用的机制。通过分析两个地级市的本地籍贯领导大力发展民生项目的行为以及普通民众对本地官员和外地官员的看法,本文详细说明了非正式制度对官员行为产生影响的机制,从而为实证分析揭示出的因果机制提供了证据。本研究认为,造成上述差异的原因在于:相比于外地官员,本地官员更多地被嵌入到当地的人际网络中,出于对本人及本家族在家乡声望的重视,他们会对民生项目有更多的投入。本文对非正式制度及两种制度互动的考察凸显出非民主国家内部官员行为丰富的制度动态。 / Literature on local government behavior in transitional China has primarily examined the impact of formal institutions on the motivations of officials in promoting local economic growth. In particular, investigations focused on how the existing personnel management system provides a “yardstick competition among local officials and therefore guarantees the success of economic reform. Meanwhile, such formal institutions have similarly been studied for the crucial reason that local government ignores the provision of public goods. Nevertheless, even after controlling the influence of formal institutions and socio-economic factors, variations could still be observed on the level of efforts among local governments regarding the provision of public goods. However, these variations cannot be sufficiently explained by existing literature. This research, based on prefectural data in China in 1990-2010, aims to fill this gap through a systematic examination of the effects of informal institutions on local government behavior, especially the casual relationship between the hometown of officials and the provision of local public goods. This research, based on prefectural data in China in 19902010, aims to fill this gap by systematically examining the effects of informal institutions on local government behavior, especially the casual relationship between the hometown of officials and the provision of local public goods. This study finds that holding other variables equal, a native prefectural leader would significantly increase fiscal expenditure rates on basic education, public health, and environmental protection in his jurisdiction, compared with a leader with a different hometown. However, the increased expenditure on public goods impacts those on infrastructure construction, which tends to incur a lower expenditure rate from a local leader compared with that of an official from other prefectures. Meanwhile, using provincial data, this research determines that informal institutions influence the upper-level government, though the effects have weakened. These findings reveal that, in an environment dominated by formal institutions, informal institutions still influence the behavior of officials. In addition, to a certain extent, informal institutions could mitigate the negative effects of formal institutions on the behavior of officials. Based on empirical findings, I used two cases and several interviews with local people and officials to further investigate the mechanism of this influence from informal institutions. By analyzing the efforts of native leaders on promoting the provision of local public goods, I illustrate the mechanism on how the informal institution shapes the behavior of officials, thereby providing evidence for a casual causal relationship. I attribute such pattern to the constraints of local reputation imposed on native officials, who would be deeply embedded in local personnel networks and therefore focus on the evaluation from local people. Local reputation thus imposes additional constraints on the behavior of native officials, which serves as a kind of bottom-up accountability. By investigating the effects of informal institutions and the interaction of formal-informal institutions, this research would help deepen our understanding on the dynamics of institutions under nondemocratic regimes and enable more accurate predictions of political behavior. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 王芳. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 146-154). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Wang Fang. / Chapter 第1章 --- 引言 --- p.1 / Chapter 第2章 --- 制度及官员行为:一个综述 --- p.10 / Chapter 2.1 --- 制度 --- p.10 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- 正式-非正式制度的划分标准 --- p.11 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- 非正式制度发挥作用的机制 --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2 --- 正式制度与官员行为 --- p.17 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- 当代中国的人事管理制度 --- p.18 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- 人事管理制度的影响 --- p.30 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- 人事管理制度与公共物品供给 --- p.35 / Chapter 2.3 --- 非正式制度与官员行为 --- p.37 / Chapter 第3章 --- 地方政府公共物品供给 --- p.46 / Chapter 3.1 --- 地方政府概况 --- p.46 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- 各级政府的性质、地位和职能 --- p.47 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- 地级市政府:历史沿革 --- p.51 / Chapter 3.1.3 --- 地级市政府:决策过程 --- p.54 / Chapter 3.2 --- 公共物品供给的法律规定及各级政府职责 --- p.62 / Chapter 3.3 --- 经济学文献上的中国公共物品供给研究 --- p.72 / Chapter 第4章 --- 籍贯:一个非正式制度 --- p.76 / Chapter 4.1 --- 官员籍贯回避制度 --- p.76 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- 帝制中国的避籍制度 --- p.77 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- 当代中国的避籍制度 --- p.84 / Chapter 4.2 --- 籍贯与官员行为 --- p.89 / Chapter 第5章 --- 数据及实证分析 --- p.93 / Chapter 5.1 --- 数据及模型 --- p.93 / Chapter 5.2 --- 实证结果及讨论 --- p.103 / Chapter 5.3 --- 非正式制度对省级政府行为的影响 --- p.109 / Chapter 第6章 --- 因果机制:案例研究 --- p.114 / Chapter 6.1 --- 案例分析 --- p.114 / Chapter 6.1.1 --- 山东省东营市市委书记石军 --- p.115 / Chapter 6.1.2 --- 甘肃省兰州市市委书记陈宝生 --- p.120 / Chapter 6.2 --- 访谈资料 --- p.124 / Chapter 6.2.1 --- 宁夏回族自治区固原市 --- p.125 / Chapter 6.2.2 --- 江苏省南京市 --- p.127 / Chapter 6.2.3 --- 内蒙古自治区兴安盟 --- p.129 / Chapter 6.2.4 --- 浙江省绍兴市 --- p.131 / Chapter 6.3 --- 本地籍贯的约束机制 --- p.133 / Chapter 第7章 --- 结论 --- p.137 / Chapter 7.1 --- 研究发现 --- p.137 / Chapter 7.2 --- 本文贡献 --- p.139 / 附录 --- p.142 / Chapter 附录一: --- 《党政领导干部任职回避暂行规定》 --- p.142 / Chapter 附录二: --- 石军简历 --- p.144 / Chapter 附录三: --- 陈宝生简历 --- p.145 / 参考文献 --- p.146 / 英文文献 --- p.146 / 中文文献 --- p.151 / 史书典籍 --- p.153 / 法律法规 --- p.153 / 媒体资源 --- p.154

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_328322
Date January 2012
Contributors王芳., Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Government and Public Administration., Wang, Fang.
Source SetsThe Chinese University of Hong Kong
LanguageChinese, English
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeText, bibliography
Formatelectronic resource, electronic resource, remote, 1 online resource (ix, 154 leaves) : ill. (some col.)
CoverageChina, China, China, China
RightsUse of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Page generated in 0.0029 seconds