The 1970s are in the limelight of a growing historiographic attention, partly due to the recent opening of
new archival resources. 1973, in particular, has a special interest in the historian’s eyes, as many are the
events that happened that year: to name but a few, the Chilean coup, the October War, the ensuing oil
crisis, the Vietnamese peace treaty. So it is may be not entirely surprising that not much attention has been
paid to the Year of Europe, a nebulous American initiative destined to sum up to nothing practical - as
Kissinger himself put it, it was destined to be the Year that never Was.1 It is my opinion, however, that its
failure should not conceal its historical interest. Even though transatlantic relations have sometimes been
seen as an uninterrupted history of crisis,2 in 1973 they reached what could then be considered as their
unprecedented nadir. I believe that a thorough analysis of the events that during that year found the US
increasingly at odds with the countries of Western Europe is worth carrying out not only to cast a new
light on the dynamics of transatlantic relations but also to deepen our comprehension of the internal
dynamics of the actors involved, mainly the Nixon administration and a unifying Europe. The Nixon
administration had not carefully planned what the initiative actually should have amounted to, and its
official announcement appears to have been one of Kissinger’s coups de theatre. Yet the Year of Europe
responded to the vital priority of revitalising the relations with Western Europe, crucial ally, for too long
neglected. But 1973 did not end with the solemn renewal of the Atlantic Declaration that Kissinger had
sought. On the contrary, it saw, for the first time, the countries of the newly enlarged EC engaged in a real,
if short-lived, solidarity on foreign policy, which highlighted the Nixon administration’s contradictions
regarding European integration. Those, in addition to the numerous tensions that already strained
transatlantic relations, gave birth to a downward spiral of incomprehensions and misperceptions, which the
unexpected deflagration of the October war seriously worsened. However, even though the tensions did
not disappear, the European front soon started to disintegrate, mainly under the strains imposed by the oil
crisis. Significant changes in the leadership of the main European countries helped to get the tones back to
normal. During the course of 1974-5, the substantial failure of the Euro-Arab dialogue, the Gymlich
compromise, frequent and serene bilateral meetings bear witness that the worst was over.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:unibo.it/oai:amsdottorato.cib.unibo.it:1112 |
| Date | 29 May 2008 |
| Creators | Pietrantonio, Silvia <1979> |
| Contributors | Del Pero, Mario |
| Publisher | Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna |
| Source Sets | Università di Bologna |
| Language | Italian |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Doctoral Thesis, PeerReviewed |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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