The 1990s included a renewed emphasis on board independence. Allegedly, the greater the proportion of independent outside directors, the more effective the board is at monitoring CEOs. I assert in this dissertation that there are limits to board independence. Specifically, when a chief executive officer (CEO) is the only inside board member, which I call a lone-insider board, a critical source of information and mutual monitoring by other inside directors is lost. Increased information asymmetry and loss of mutual monitoring gives CEOs more freedom to influence organizational outcomes toward their personal preferences and in conflict with shareholders' interests. Contrary to expectations, results indicate lone-insider boards are fulfilling their fiduciary responsibilities in the area of executive compensation. However, lone-insider boards need to limit CEO duality as well as encourage long-term strategies such as research and development investment. This study also found that blockholders are somewhat detrimental in lone-insider boards, because they increase total CEO compensation and compensation differentials on the top management team. Duality is also more common when blockholders are present. Finally, as lone-insider boards increase in size, they generally lose their effectiveness. Duality is more common in larger lone-insider boards, and two of the three measures of executive compensation are greater. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Management in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester, 2008. / June 13, 2008. / Corporate Governance Financial Controls, Board Composition, Duality, Executive Compensation, Agency Theory / Includes bibliographical references. / James G. Combs, Professor Directing Dissertation; Michael K. Brady, Outside Committee Member; Bruce T. Lamont, Committee Member; Jack T. Fiorito, Committee Member; Timothy R. Holcomb, Committee Member.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:fsu.edu/oai:fsu.digital.flvc.org:fsu_180960 |
| Contributors | Martin, John A. (authoraut), Combs, James G. (professor directing dissertation), Brady, Michael K. (outside committee member), Lamont, Bruce T. (committee member), Fiorito, Jack T. (committee member), Holcomb, Timothy R. (committee member), Department of Management (degree granting department), Florida State University (degree granting institution) |
| Publisher | Florida State University, Florida State University |
| Source Sets | Florida State University |
| Language | English, English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, text |
| Format | 1 online resource, computer, application/pdf |
| Rights | This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s). The copyright in theses and dissertations completed at Florida State University is held by the students who author them. |
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