The aggregate power of all resources on the Internet is enormous. The Internet can
be viewed as a massive virtual organization that holds tremendous amounts of information
and resources with different ownerships. However, little is known about how to run this
organization efficiently.
This dissertation studies the problems of distributed task and resource allocation
among self-interested agents in virtual organizations. The developed solutions are not
allocation mechanisms that can be imposed by a centralized designer, but decentralized
interaction mechanisms that provide incentives to self-interested agents to behave
cooperatively. These mechanisms also take computational tractability into consideration
due to the inherent complexity of distributed task and resource allocation problems.
Targeted allocation mechanisms can achieve global task allocation efficiency in a
virtual organization and establish stable resource-sharing communities based on agentsâÃÂÃÂ
own decisions about whether or not to behave cooperatively. This high level goal requires
solving the following problems: synthetic task allocation, decentralized coalition formation
and automated multiparty negotiation. For synthetic task allocation, in which each task needs to be accomplished by a
virtual team composed of self-interested agents from different real organizations, my
approach is to formalize the synthetic task allocation problem as an algorithmic mechanism
design optimization problem. I have developed two approximation mechanisms that I prove
are incentive compatible for a synthetic task allocation problem.
This dissertation also develops a decentralized coalition formation mechanism,
which is based on explicit negotiation among self-interested agents. Each agent makes its
own decisions about whether or not to join a candidate coalition. The resulting coalitions
are stable in the core in terms of coalition rationality. I have applied this mechanism to
form resource sharing coalitions in computational grids and buyer coalitions in electronic
markets.
The developed negotiation mechanism in the decentralized coalition formation
mechanism realizes automated multilateral negotiation among self-interested agents who
have symmetric authority (i.e., no mediator exists and agents are peers).
In combination, the decentralized allocation mechanisms presented in this
dissertation lay a foundation for realizing automated resource management in open and
scalable virtual organizations.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:tamu.edu/oai:repository.tamu.edu:1969.1/5864 |
| Date | 17 September 2007 |
| Creators | He, Linli |
| Contributors | Ioerger, Thomas R. |
| Publisher | Texas A&M University |
| Source Sets | Texas A and M University |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Book, Thesis, Electronic Dissertation, text |
| Format | 737272 bytes, electronic, application/pdf, born digital |
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