A failure of systemically important bank was up to the present time in most cases avoided through providing financial support by government because there were concerns about destroying the financial stability followed by decline in economic activity because of size, interconnectedness and limited substitutability of the failing bank. However, the implicit governmental guarantees for systemically important banks create many distortions in an economy which are desirable to eliminate. Considering restriction of moral hazard, no increase in systemic risk and preservation of social benefits of G-SIBs the parallel implementation of higher capital requirements and recovery and resolution policy seems to be the most effective measure from proposed regulatory measures for systemically important banks. The future benefits and costs of these measures will be dependent in a high degree on the form and way in which the new rules will be incorporated by governments to their national regulatory frameworks.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:150042 |
| Date | January 2012 |
| Creators | Buchta, Martin |
| Contributors | Půlpánová, Stanislava, Hradil, Dušan |
| Publisher | Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | Czech |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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