Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2001. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis seeks to evaluate MacIntyre's claim that recourse to the tradition
of virtue ethics in the Aristotelian-Thomist sense is the only viable intellectual
option, given the alleged demise of the so-called"Enlightenment Project".
It raises a twofold question: First, is it coherent to argue that MacIntyre's reappropriation
of an ancient moral tradition is possible? Does such a claim
duly reckon with the conditions under which meaningful forms are
understood? The first claim being defended is that MacIntyre does not
sufficiently respect Gadamer's conditions under which understanding occurs.
It is also argued that MacIntyre does not provide coherent conditions for
rationally choosing between traditions in order to possibly vindicate them. As
such, MacIntyre's re-appropriating of the Aristotelian tradition in moral theory
is not coherent and convincing.
Secondly, does the dichotomy of "Nietzsche versus Aristotle" represent the
only viable alternatives for us in our efforts to continue the enterprise of
moral theorising? The second claim being defended is that the dichotomy is
not a coherent way of moral theorising. The third claim being defended is
that Gadamer represents a viable alternative to the ultimatum in that his
thought provides the possibility of a more coherent way of moral theorising
than MacIntyre's. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis stel ten doel die evaluasie van MacIntyre se standpunt dat die
deugde-etiek van die Aristoteliaanse-Thomistiestradisie die enigste blywende
opsie is, aangesiendie sogenaamde"Verligtingsprojek" misluk het.
Die tesis stel twee kernvrae aan die orde: Eerstens, is dit sinvol om te
argumenteer dat MacIntyre se appropriasie van bogenoemde etiese tradisie
moontlik is? Verleen so n aanspraak genoegsame waarde aan die kondisies
waaronder sindraers verstaan word? Die eerste standpunt wat verdedig
word, is dat MacIntyre nie genoeg ag slaan op Gadamer se opvatting oor die
kondisies vir verstaan nie. Daar word verder ook geargumenteer dat
MacIntyre nie koherente kondisies aandui vir 'n keuse tussen tradisies nie en
as sodanig ondermyn dit die koherensie van sy werk. MacIntyre se
appropriasie van die Aristoteliaanse tradisie in morele teorie is dus nie
koherent of oortuigend nie.
Tweedens, is die dichotomie van "Nietzsche of Aristoteles" die enigste
moontlike alternatief vir die voortgaande studie van morele teorie? Die
tweede aanspraak wat verdedig word, is dat die dichotomie nie 'n koherente
wyse van morele argumentasie is nie. Die derde aanspraak wat verdedig word
is dat Gadamer 'n werkbare alternatief verskaf vir die dichotomie. Sy denke
voorsien 'n meer koherente wyse om met morele teorie om te gaan as die
een wat MacIntyre verskaf.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:sun/oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/52607 |
| Date | 12 1900 |
| Creators | Hoch, Jonathan (Jonathan Leith) |
| Contributors | Van Niekerk, A. A., Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy. |
| Publisher | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | en_ZA |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | 110 p. |
| Rights | Stellenbosch University |
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