We construct a measure of CEO concern for non-equity stakeholders based on corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores, and we investigate how such incentives affect firm leverage and cash holding. In general, we find that non-equity stakeholder incentives decrease leverage and increase cash holding, after controlling for CEO managerial incentives and other firm characteristics. Our findings suggest that corporate social responsibility benefit non-equity stakeholders, which may come at the expense of shareholders.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:USASK/oai:ecommons.usask.ca:10388/ETD-2015-08-2209 |
| Date | 2015 August 1900 |
| Contributors | Maung, Min, Wilson, Craig |
| Source Sets | University of Saskatchewan Library |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text, thesis |
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