This thesis indicates that the relationship between the budgetary participation and managerial performance of Japanese companies in Taiwan is practical. If organizational performance is an intervening variable of budgetary participation and organizational commitment, it proves that the relationship budgetary participation and organizational commitment is positive and obvious. It also reveals that organizational commitment and managerial performance also have a positive relationship. In addition, budgetary participation can get an indirect influence to increase managerial performance by adding organizational commitment.,
The demonstrations show that the relationship between budgetary participation and managerial performance is negative, which is the same as the outcome of Sterdry (1960), Bryan & Locke (1967), Blumenfield & Leidly (1969) and Cherrington (1973). However, it is different from that of Argyris (1955), Brownell (1982), Brownell & McInnes (1986), Govindarajan (1986), Dunk (1990), Kren (1992). Therefore, the relationship between budgetary performance and managerial performance has not reached a consistent conclusion until now.
In order to explain the inconsistent relationship between budgetary participation and managerial performance, the studies are based on the organizational commitment as an intervening variable. After the demonstrations, without dividing into groups, organizational commitment has an indirect influence between budgetary participation and managerial performance. However, by dividing into groups, it does not indicate the causation relationship except that of the group of Taiwanese managers to join the formal budgetary participation.
According to different nations and different ways to join in a group by dividing into variable groups, with an advanced research, it reveals that the relevant coefficient of organizational commitment and managerial performance is positive for Japanese managers. Moreover, the relevant coefficient of the group of informal budgetary participation is much higher than that of the group of formal budgetary participation. Thus, it proves that Japanese managers prefer to the informal budgetary participation, which matches the assumption of studies. For Japanese companies, the pattern to make decisions depends on the agreement of each member, and the managers prefer to cooperate with them in private (NEMAWASHI). For Budgetary Participation, it is just formal.
Although the relevant coefficient of budgetary participation and organizational commitment for Taiwanese managers shows the positive aspects, it is impossible to achieve the indirect affection to increase the managerial performance within the use of organizational commitment. It indicates that Taiwanese managers can¡¦t possess the power to make decisions in the Japanese companies. Though they join those formal meetings of budgetary participation, they still can¡¦t increase managerial performance without any incentives.
Therefore, it is not ideal to establish the budge of each department in a company only to encourage them to join meetings. It is to reward them or to give them spiritual support that can increase the managerial performance. This research can provide Japanese companies in Taiwan with the most important references to design or implement the budgetary system in achieving the expected goal.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0719101-123257 |
| Date | 19 July 2001 |
| Creators | Su, Mine |
| Contributors | Feng Yu Ni, An Lin Chen, Pei How Hung |
| Publisher | NSYSU |
| Source Sets | NSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
| Language | Cholon |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0719101-123257 |
| Rights | unrestricted, Copyright information available at source archive |
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