Market power mitigation has been an integral part of wholesale electricity markets since deregulation. In wholesale electricity markets, different regions in the US take different approaches to regulating market power. While the exercise of market power has received considerable attention in the literature, the issue of market power mitigation has attracted scant attention. In the first chapter, I examine the market power mitigation rules used in New York ISO (Independent System Operator) and California ISO (CAISO) with respect to day-ahead and real-time energy markets. I test whether markups associated with New York in-city generators would be lower with an alternative approach to mitigation, the CAISO approach. Results indicate the difference in markups between these two mitigation rules is driven by the shape of residual demand curves for suppliers. Analysis of residual demand curves faced by New York in-city suppliers show similar markups under both mitigation rules when no one supplier is necessary to meet the demand (i.e., when no supplier is pivotal). However, when some supplier is crucial for the market to clear, the mitigation rule adopted by the NYISO consistently leads to higher markups than would the CAISO rule. This result suggest that market power episodes in New York is confined to periods where some supplier is pivotal. As a result, I find that applying the CAISOs' mitigation rules to the New York market could lower wholesale electricity prices by 18%. The second chapter of my dissertation focuses on supply function equilibrium. In power markets, suppliers submit offer curves in auctions, indicating their willingness to supply at different price levels. Although firms are allowed to submit different offer curves for different time periods, surprisingly many firms stick to a single offer curve for the entire day. This essentially means that firms are submitting a single offer curve for multiple demand realizations. A suitable framework to analyze such oligopolistic competition between power market suppliers is supply function equilibrium models. Using detailed bidding data, I develop equilibrium in supply functions by restricting supplier offers to a class of supply functions. By collating equilibrium supply functions corresponding to different realizations of demand, I obtain a single optimal supply function for the entire day. Then I compare the resulting supply function with actual day-ahead offers in New York. In addition to supply function equilibrium, I also develop a conservative bidding approach in which each firm assumes that rivals bid at marginal costs. Results show that the supply functions derived from equilibrium bidding model in this paper is not consistent with actual bidding in New York. This result is mainly driven by the class of supply functions used in this study to generate the equilibrium. Further, actual offers do not resemble offers generated by the conservative bidding algorithm.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:arizona.edu/oai:arizona.openrepository.com:10150/321578 |
| Date | January 2014 |
| Creators | Subramaniam, Thiagarajah Natchie |
| Contributors | Gowrisankaran, Gautam, Thompson, Gary D., Gowrisankaran, Gautam, Thompson, Gary D., Reynolds, Stanley S., Langer, Ashley A., Lemoine, Derek M., Aradhyula, Satheesh V. |
| Publisher | The University of Arizona. |
| Source Sets | University of Arizona |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text, Electronic Dissertation |
| Rights | Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. |
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