Long-term relationships are desirable to the structuring of interfirm exchange as they afford firms with specific advantages. The effective governance of these relationships is important for their success. In this study a framework is proposed that looks at the effects of governance processes on the attitudinal outcomes of the vulnerable channel members. Specifically the framework proposes that in unilateral governance formats, governance processes are used to control opportunism. However, the perceptions of justice of the more vulnerable party in the channel relationship moderates the effect of control mechanisms on opportunism as well as other attitudinal channel outcomes. The theoretical framework is tested in the automobile franchise context which exhibits consistent unilateral governance structures. Questionnaires were mailed to five hundred automobile franchisees. The results show that governance mechanisms have an effect on the attitudes of channel members and that justice moderates the relationship between governance and relationship outcomes but not to the extent hypothesized indicating the existence of other contextual factors that may moderate the relationship between governance and outcomes.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UMASS/oai:scholarworks.umass.edu:dissertations-2320 |
| Date | 01 January 2004 |
| Creators | Kashyap, Vishal |
| Publisher | ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst |
| Source Sets | University of Massachusetts, Amherst |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Source | Doctoral Dissertations Available from Proquest |
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