本论文由两个供应链模型组成，是关于定价、渠道结构和策略消费者行为的综合研究。 / 由于互联网和电子商务的出现，在过去几年中大量创新的销售策略被引入到在线旅游业内。在第一部分中，我们主要研究了策略消费者的情绪因子（后悔）和不同的信息结构在“买方自主定价“渠道中的影响。通过加入策略消费者的预期后悔，我们首先刻画了每个消费者的购买渠道选择和投标策略，然后导出了以最大化利润为目标、具有双渠道结构的寡头服务供应商的贝叶斯纳什均衡，通过比较得到服务供应商的最优销售渠道选择和最优定价。最后，我们评估了不同类型的预期后悔（预期作为后悔和预期不作为后悔）对服务供应商定价，总利润和最优销售渠道选择的影响。对不同的信息结构按照相同的逻辑也做了分析。 / 另一方面，随着公众越来越意识到环境问题，绿色供应链管理已经得到了越来越多的关注。在第二部分中，我们建立了公司在两个部门下分别管理其新产品和可区分的再制造产品的定价模型。我们首先把在两个独立市场下的研究作为这一问题的基准，然后得到了在同一市场的广义模型下，集中式系统的最优定价以及分散式系统的纳什均衡结果。通过对确定性模型的分析和数值试验，得到了管理上的一些洞识。 / This thesis, consisting of two supply chain models, is an integrated study of pricing, channel structures and strategic consumer behavior. / Due to the the emergence of internet and e-commerce, masses of innovative selling strategies have been introduced in the online travel industry over the past few years. In the first part, we mainly investigate the impact of the strategic consumer’s emotional factor (regret) and the alternative information structure on the Name-Your-Own-Price (NYOP) channel. By incorporating the strategic consumers’ anticipated regret, we first characterize the optimal channel choice and bidding strategy for each consumer. Then we derive the Bayesian Nash equilibrium for a profit maximizing monopoly service provider with a dual channel. Optimal channel selection, followed by the corresponding optimal pricing decision, are obtained via comparison. Finally, we evaluate the impact of different types of anticipated regret - action regret and inaction regret - on the service provider’s pricing, overall profit and optimal channel selections. The alternative information structure could be analyzed following the same logic. / On the other hand, Green Supply Chain Management has gained increasing attention as the public becomes more aware of environmental issues. In the second part, we examine a pricing model for a firm that manages both new and differentiated remanufactured products under two divisions. We first investigate the problem under two independent markets as a baseline, and then derive the optimal pricing decisions in a centralized system as well as the Nash equilibrium results in a decentralized system for the general model under one market. Several managerial insights are obtained from the deterministic model and numerical study. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Jiang, Jun. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 113-124). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese. / Table of Contents --- p.x / Chapter 0 --- Notation / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Sell through an NYOP Channel: Information and Regret --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1 --- Introduction --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Literature Review --- p.11 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Regret Theory --- p.11 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Name-Your-Own-Price Selling Mechanism --- p.13 / Chapter 2.3 --- The General Model and Assumptions --- p.16 / Chapter 2.4 --- Consumer Regret --- p.19 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Consumer Inaction Regret --- p.20 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Bayesian Nash Equilibrium with Inaction Regret --- p.29 / Chapter 2.4.3 --- Consumer Action Regret --- p.32 / Chapter 2.4.4 --- Comparison --- p.35 / Chapter 2.5 --- Consumer Information --- p.40 / Chapter 2.5.1 --- Clear Capacity --- p.40 / Chapter 2.5.2 --- No Commitment of Clearing Capacity --- p.43 / Chapter 2.6 --- Extensions --- p.45 / Chapter 2.6.1 --- Vertical Integration of the NYOP Channel --- p.45 / Chapter 2.6.2 --- Optimal Linear Pricing Contract --- p.47 / Chapter 2.7 --- Numerical Study --- p.50 / Chapter 2.7.1 --- The Impact of Inaction Regret --- p.50 / Chapter 2.7.2 --- The Impact of Action Regret --- p.55 / Chapter 2.7.3 --- The Impact of Information --- p.59 / Chapter 2.8 --- Summary --- p.61 / Chapter 3 --- Intra-firm Competition in Manufacturing and Remanufacturing Operations --- p.62 / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.62 / Chapter 3.2 --- Literature Review --- p.65 / Chapter 3.3 --- The Model --- p.67 / Chapter 3.4 --- Random Return --- p.68 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- Independent Market --- p.69 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- Centralized System --- p.70 / Chapter 3.4.3 --- Decentralized System --- p.72 / Chapter 3.4.4 --- Multiplicative Return Form --- p.81 / Chapter 3.4.5 --- Efficiency Improvement Methods --- p.83 / Chapter 3.5 --- Deterministic Model --- p.85 / Chapter 3.5.1 --- Independent Market --- p.85 / Chapter 3.5.2 --- Centralized System --- p.86 / Chapter 3.5.3 --- Decentralized System --- p.89 / Chapter 3.5.4 --- Coordination --- p.92 / Chapter 3.6 --- Numerical Study --- p.94 / Chapter 3.6.1 --- The Impact of System Parameters --- p.94 / Chapter 3.6.2 --- Deterministic Model --- p.97 / Chapter 3.6.3 --- Efficiency Improvement Comparison --- p.99 / Chapter 3.7 --- Summary --- p.100 / Chapter 4 --- Conclusion --- p.101 / Appendix / Bibliography --- p.113
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_328172 |
| Date | January 2012 |
| Contributors | Jiang, Jun, Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management. |
| Source Sets | The Chinese University of Hong Kong |
| Language | English, Chinese |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, bibliography |
| Format | electronic resource, electronic resource, remote, 1 online resource (xv, 124 leaves) : ill. (some col.) |
| Rights | Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) |
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