This dissertation analyzes problems related to matching in general networks and decision under uncertainty. Chapter 1 introduces the framework of convex matching games. Chapter 2 discusses three distinct applications of the framework. Chapter 3 develops a new test of choice models with expected utility.
In Chapter 1, I use Scarf's lemma to show that given a convexity structure that I introduce, the core of a matching game is always nonempty, and the framework I introduce can accommodate general contracting networks, multilateral contracts, and complementary preferences.
In Chapter 2, I provide three applications to show how the convexity structure is satisfied in different contexts by different assumptions. In the first application, I show that in large economies, the convexity structure is satisfied if the set of participants in each contract is small compared to the overall economy. The second application considers finite economies, and I show that the convexity structure is satisfied if all agents have convex, but not necessarily substitutable, preferences. The third application considers a large-firm, many-to-one matching market with peer preferences, and I show that the convexity structure is satisfied under convexity of preferences and a competition aversion restriction on workers' preferences over colleagues.
In Chapter 3, I show that some form of cyclic choice pattern across distinct information scenarios should be regarded as inconsistent with a utility function that is linear in beliefs.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:columbia.edu/oai:academiccommons.columbia.edu:10.7916/D8N02PX2 |
| Date | January 2018 |
| Creators | Wu, Xingye |
| Source Sets | Columbia University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Theses |
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