A review of the philosophical and psychological literature on free will is presented. Three major positions are identified: libertarianism, hard determinism and compatibilism (or soft determinism). The latter enjoys widespread and largely unchallenged support in psychology. Substantive conceptual and empirical grounds are presented which suggest that psychologists may be dismissing free will at their peril. It is argued, first of all, that belief in the reality of free will has profound implications for conceptions of human action, of moral responsibility, of the form and veracity of scientific accounts and of the validity of scientific reduction. Moreover, the results of a multi-disciplinary survey of academics reveal that 80% of those surveyed believe free will is real. Contrary to popular assumptions in psychology, determinism is not endorsed by many scientists outside of psychology, nor does belief in free will reflect naive belief in mind-body dualism. Modern libertarians reject both dualism and reductionism, distinguishing instead between different levels of scientific explanation. The findings are discussed in terms of their theoretical implications for cognitive, social and clinical psychology, and directions for further research are suggested.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.77104 |
| Date | January 1981 |
| Creators | Doan, Brian D. |
| Publisher | McGill University |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Coverage | Doctor of Philosophy (Department of Psychology) |
| Rights | All items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated. |
| Relation | alephsysno: 000137206, proquestno: AAINK54779, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest. |
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