This thesis serves as an introduction and overview of the broad and closely related fields of mechanism design, contract theory, and information economics. Each chapter is intended to provide a self-contained guide to the particular area of application -- examples include adverse selection, moral hazard, and auctions. The reader should benefit from the thesis in two ways: by understanding the general notions of the revelation principle, incentive compatibility, and individual rationality from the mechanism design theory as well as by examining the particular information asymmetry models in the individual areas. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:341694 |
| Date | January 2014 |
| Creators | Albert, Branislav |
| Contributors | Červinka, Michal, Adam, Tomáš |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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