Judges are often reluctant to interact with medical ethics when deciding cases with an inherently ethical content. They sometimes even transfer decision-making responsibilities to medical ethics groups. At times this unwillingness is based on the presumption that medical ethics will be able to perform an effective regulatory function. The problem is there is a wide range of ethical discourse, both official and unofficial; so much it can cancel itself out. Therefore, as a regulatory tool for the medical profession, medical ethics is insufficient for the job. Judges, on the other hand, could arbitrate between competing ethical conclusions. Indeed, there is a strong argument they \(should\). This thesis addresses this timely and complex issue. Judges need to be willing and able to rely on the soundness of their own moral convictions to recognise and deal appropriately with the inherent ethical content in certain cases. In order to do this, they need a decision-making framework that recognises the ethical nature of judicial decision-making, so as to provide judges with confidence in applying moral principles and medical ethics. This thesis will provide such an integrated framework.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:636836 |
| Date | January 2015 |
| Creators | Hobson, Clark Ashley |
| Publisher | University of Birmingham |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/5652/ |
Page generated in 0.0016 seconds